Abstract: This paper discusses results and difficulties of comparing banks' performance based on publicly available data for the case of Nordea, a pan-Nordic bank created through mergers of important national banks. The objective of the performance comparison is to determine whether Nordea's unique strategy of functional intergation across four countries can be advantageous. For stock-market data, however, Nordea does not have stable betas on risk factors, as illustrated by market betas, and thus the comparables method must be used with great care. The Nordea holding company performed about as well as the comparables, both in terms of stock-market and accounting data. Nordea banks in individual countries outperformed comparable holding companies; by arithmetic, Nordea non-bank operations are not as profitable as its bank operations. In event studies, the market views Nordea's acquisitions as adding value.
Introduction
Nordea provides a virtually unique experiment in cross-border banking. Most cross-border banks are large relative to the market in their home countries but small relative to their hostcountry markets. Further, the degree of integration across home-and host-country operations is typically rather small-back office and information operations may be integrated, and the bank typically tries to use lessons learned in the home country to improve techniques in its hostcountry operations, but seldom more. Many financial institutions have portfolio investments in financial institutuions outside their home countries, some have branches in foreign countries mainly to provide services there to their major home-country customers, and some have fullservice subsidiaries that are, however, substantially smaller than home country operations. In contrast, Nordea's strategy is to provide a full range of financial services throughout each of the Nordic countries-Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden-in an integrated organization as if the four countries were one. Nordea was built by merger and acquisition of on-going wellestablished full-service financial institutions with sizeable market share. Nordea's strategy is built on the assumption that there are economies of scope and scale in financial services that cannot be reaped even by a bank that is large relative to any single Nordic market, but can be reaped by a bank with large operations in each Nordic country. In the future, other banks may adopt the Nordea full-service multiple-country strategy, especially if Nordea's experiment proves successful.
There are pro and con arguments about whether Nordea's strategy is likely to work. On the one hand, a big Nordic bank is small relative to big banks in the U.K., Germany, France, the U.S., … Some argue that, ultimately, such Nordic minnows cannot compete against these largecountry whales, because the whales reap economies of scale and scope, and possibly can save on taxes by internalizing operations. On the other hand, some argue that individual Nordic countries are niches, and niche players can be quite profitable if they are nimble and sophisticated. They can outperform any big foreign bank that tries to move in. In this view, the economies of scale and scope are much oversold and if they exist they cannot offset the advantages niche-players have in their knowledge and skills in their niches. This implies that a Nordicization strategy such as Nordea's is likely to fail-it incurs extra costs in pursuing economies of scale and scope that are likely not important and perhaps forfeits nice advantages.
Nordea's experiment raises a host of questions regarding, for example, transnational regulation, the source and existence of economies of scope and scale in financial serives and the appropriate mix of uniformity across countries for some services versus the use of national banking practices in each country for other services. A fundamental question is the economic success of Nordea's experiment. It may well be too early to give a satisfactory evaluation of Nordea's economic success. First, a number of the constituent financial institutions from which Nordea was built were in need of improvements when incorporated into Nordea. Second, Nordea is an on-going experiment in which previously foreseen problems are still being addressed, for example, optimal legal and functional organization. Third, unforeseen problems arise in any experiment, and Nordea is still addressing these, for example, problems due to the Nordic countries' different legal and tax systems. Further, an observer must make allowances for factors specific to Nordea's current management team; maybe the team is so good that it can make a bad strategy work; or maybe the team is sub-par and unable to make a fine strategy work as it should.
Nevertheless, the Nordea experiment is of sufficient interest that it is useful to present results of evaluating Nordea's economic track record thus far. Further, in evaluating Nordea, comparables play a large role, and this paper lays out some of the serious difficulties that must be faced in using comparables to evaluate Nordea, and future possible cross-border banking experiments, and provides possible solutions to the problems encounted below in using comparables.
The results for Nordea are mixed. Nordea is clearly not an outstanding success relative to a variety of benchmarks used here, but Nordea is hardly a failure. Further, Nordea seems to be doing relatively better in some countries than in others, adding further complications to the picture. Finally, Nordea's banking activities appear to be substantially more profitable than its other activities, though the evidence for Nordea's profitability in banking must be taken as tentative, because it comes from evaluating Nordea banks relative to holding companies of competitors. In considering the profitability of Nordea bansk, it should be noted banking is the least integrated product area across the four countries, and thus a candidate for earning rents.
The main analytical tool is to evaluate Nordea's performance in terms of stock-market rates of return and accounting rates of return relative to a group of comparable Nordic financial institutions. Use of comparables as a benchmark is common in firm valuation and in event studies; indeed, whatever other methods a study might use, a complete study includes results from using comparables as a benchmark. In the Nordea case, however, the use of comparables as a benchmark is difficult at a minimum and many may view it as highly questionable. This is because analysis below shows that the underlying parameters in the Data Generating Process for Nordea rates of return shift importantly over time, but the parameters in the DGP for the comparables do not shift as much or in the same way. In particular, the required rate of return for the Nordea holding company shifts importantly a number of times over the sample period, but the required rate of return for the comparables index shows much less important shifts. Thus, substantial variations in Nordea's stock-market performance relative to the comparables may be explained in important part by variations in Nordea's required rate of return. This explanation still leaves the puzzle, however, of why Nordea's management adopted policies that led to large swings in the holding company's required rate of return.
Section 2. Data and Data Issues
The Nordea holding company that exists In evaluating Nordea's performance, two types of comparisons are used. The first is financial rates of return from the Nordea holding company versus rates of return (a) from the competitors in the Nordic countries and (b) from measures of the world market. The full names of the Nordic comparables are listed in Appendix A; all appendices are omitted from this paper but are available from the authors. Data from the Nordic competitors allow construction of benchmarks against which Nordea can be measured. The Data Appendix (Appendix B) provides information on the sources of data for Nordea and its competitors and on the various benchmarks; the benchmarks are also discussed in the text below. The second type of comparison is accounting data for Nordea versus a number of competitors from each of the Nordic countries. Though Nordea provides accounting data on its banking operations in individual countries, its competitors do not break out banking operations; hence, Nordea banks are evaluated relative to competitors' holding companies, thus allowing some inferences that are more limited and less solid than if data on competitors' banks were available.
The various Nordea organizations and the financial institutions used as comparables in this study are listed in Appendix A; there are 16 comparable financial institutions, six in Denmark, four in Finland, three in Norway and three in Sweden. The Appendix B (the Data Appendix) discusses how they were selected. The criteria emphasized comparable size and lines of business, and aimed at having a minimum of five comparables from each country. In practice, it was impossible to find as many comparable as the initial research design called for, and essentially all Nordic financial service firms were included in the comparables if they were large enough, had a full line of financial services and had an adequate number of time-series observation. Note that the Nordea banks and comparable banks cover approximately 95 percent of the banking operations in each of the Nordic countries. The exact definitions of the variables and ratios used in this paper's analysis are in Appendix C. As signaled by the differences in Appendix C in variable definitions across the Nordic countries, the four countries' accounting systems differ importantly; further, the differences are greater than those Appendix C reveals. Without access to internal data, it is impossible to restate the four countries' banks' accounting data on the same basis. Thus, this paper uses the only data available, in the belief that if the data are treated with care and caution, cross-country comparisons can be useful. Note that such data problems are general in cross-country bank studies; further, similar problems arise in any cross-country study of firms, and is not necessarily worse for banks than for other types of firms.
Nordea's Financial-Market Performance
This section examines financial markets' judgement of Nordea's economic performance.
The analysis begins by examining Nordea holding company 1 rates of return relative to an index of comparables. When using accounting data, the subject firm's results are typically examined relative to comparables, and this is done below. If the comparables approach is also used to evaluate financial performance, the researcher can judge financial and accounting results on the same basis; further, in the 1990s it became fairly standard to use comparables for judging performance and for examining the financial-market wealth effects of various events. For both reasons, this paper initially uses the comparables approach to evaluate Nordea's financial-market performanc; Lee (1997) and Lyons et al. (1999) discuss the use of comparable firms in evaluating performance.
Nordea's Performance Relative to Comparables. This section begins by comparing the log of the relative wealth index of Nordea, measured in Danish kronor, to an equally-weighted average of the log of the relative wealth indices of 11 comparables 2 , also measured in Danish kronor; note that abnormal returns are independent of the currency in which the returns are calculated, and this is so whether the benchmark is comparables' rates of return or market rates of return. 3 Of the 16 comparables available for this study, only 11 have price and dividend data available that allow them to be used as comparables for Nordea rates of return.
1 The Nordea parent company went by a variety of names over time; the evolution of the company and its names are discussed below. 2 This approach means that the first difference of the the comparables index is an equally weighted average of the eleven log rates of return. An alternative is to take the log of the average of the relative wealth indices of the 11 countries; the first diffenece of this log index is not an equally weighted average of the log rates of return of the eleven comparables. 3 This can be seen by supposing that it is desired to convert the rates of return to another currency, say the U.S. dollar. Each rate of return [1 + (P j,t + Div j,t -P j,t-1 ) / P j,t-1 ] can be divided by (1 + ∆S t / S t-1 ) where S t is the number of DKK per USD, to give [1 + (P j,t + Div j,t -P j,t-1 ) / P j,t-1 ] / (1 + ∆S t / S t-1 ). The natural log is ln[1 + (P j,t + Div j,t -P j,t-1 ) / P j,t-1 ] -ln(1 + ∆S t / S t-1 ). If abnormal returns in USD are formed, the abnormal return is ln[1 + (P j,t + Div j,t -P j,t-1 ) / P j,t-1 ] -ln(1 + ∆S t / S t-1 ) -{∆lnRWI C,t -ln(1 + ∆S t / S t-1 )} = ln[1 + (P j,t + Div j,t -P j,t-1 ) / P j,t-1 ] -∆lnRWI C,t .
A relative wealth index supposes that one krone is invested at the start of the period in a given asset, and shows how the value of this krone changes over time, due to price appreciation and dividend payments. The relative wealth index for asset j at time t is RWI j,t = [1 + (P j,1 + Div j,1 -P j,0 ) / P j,0 ] [1 + (P j,2 + Div j,2 -P j,1 ) / P j,1 ]
The natural logarithm of RWI j,t is ln(RWI j,t ) = ln[1 + (P j,1 + Div j,1 -P j,0 ) / P j,0 ] + ln[1 + (P j,2 + Div j,2 -P j,1 ) / P j,1 ]
The benchmark rate of return based on the eleven comparables is an equally weighted average of the ∆ln(RWI j,t ), R C,t = (1/11) Σ 11 j=1 ∆ln(RWI j,t ) = (1/11) Σ 11 j=1 ln[1 + (P j,t + Div j,t -P j,t-1 ) / P j,t-1 ] = (1/11) Σ The comparables have a median of 0.000852, reflecting the left skewness of the comparable rates of return; Nordea has a median of zero, reflecting the right skewness on its rates of return. The Nordea and comparables standard deviations of rates of return are 0.023632 and 0.009511, or 37.365473%/annum and 15.038211%/annum; the difference reflects in part the fact that the comparables are an average and thus show diversification effects that reduce the average's variance. Both distributions show positive and significant excess kurtosis (fat tails relative to a normal distribution). Further, from the Jarque-Bera statistic, both distributions are far from normal. Nordea rates of return and comparables rates of return may be unstable, and related (b) the use of comparables as the benchmark may not be appropriate. Though the use of comparables as a benchmark is common, its underlying assumptions do not always hold. In particular, if the abnomal return is formed as AR N,t = R N,t -R C,t , where R N,t is the rate of return on Nordea at t and R C,t the benchmark rate of return on the comparables, the implicit assumption is that the beta for each priced, economy-wide factor is the same for Nordea and the comparables, or β N,k,t ≈ β C,k,t for k = 1,K, where K is the number of priced factors, so that both Nordea and the comparables have the same required rate of return. 6 This assumption is not valid in the Nordea case, as seen below by examining market models. 6 Let the expected/required rate of return be ER j,t = E 0 + ∑ K k=1 β j,k,t λ k , where E 0 is the required rate of return on a portfolio with no beta risk, β j,k,t the beta of asset j on risk factor k at t, and λ k the risk premium on risk factor k (assumed time-constant), and exact factor pricing is assumed. The actual return is R j,t = E 0 + ∑
β j,k,t δ k,t + ε j,t , where δ k,t is the surprise in risk factor k at time t, and ε j,t the idiosyncratic return to j. If an index of Table 1 Sweeney and Warga (1986) discuss multi-factor asset-pricing models.
Instability in Nordea's Market Beta. The market betas for both the comparables and
Nordea, but especially Nordea, show instability over time, 9 as illustrated in Table 1, For the 1995-2003 period, the market beta estimates are 0.394593 for the comparables and comparables is used to adjust R j,t , the abnormal return is AR j,t = R j,t -R C,t = E 0 + ∑
Assuming that the comparables portfolio is well diversified, then ε C,t ≈ 0 and AR j,t ≈ ε j,t . The method of comparbles is designed to detect significant averages of ε j,t . But consider the effects of β j,k,t ≠ β C,k,t , for example, β j,k,t > β C,k,t . If δ k,t = 0 = ε j,t = ε C,t so the analyst would expect expected AR j,t = 0, instead AR j,t = (β j,k,t -β C,k,t ) λ k > < 0 as λ k > < 0; thus, j will appear to out-or under-perform the comparables simply because it has higher beta risk. Note that if the average AR j,t is positive, this is interpreted as the average ε j,t being positive, and the firm earning a higher average return over the period than can be explained by risk. Note further that if the market reacts to an event such as an acquisition by showing a sequence of say positive ε j,t before and after the event, this can be interpreted as the market efficiently learning about the event and its implications, or as slow adjustment due to inefficiency. 7 A closely related issue is the stability of the parameters in the data generating processes for both Nordea and the comparables: if the DGPs show temporal instability, this instability must be accounted for if parameters are to be correctly estimated in investigating whether β N,k,t ≈ β C,k,t .
0.327234-20.58% less-for Nordea. For the comparables, sub-period beta estimates range from a high of 0.419814 in the first sub-period to a low of 0.365004 (15.02% less) in second subperiod (2001) (2002) (2003) . Nordea betas show a substantially greater range, from a high of 0.550798 in the first sub-period to a low of 0.083736 [less by 557.78% = (0.550798 / 0.083736 -1) x 100] in the second sub-period, and the data reject the null that the betas are the same across the two subperiods at the 0.00004 significance level. The comparables market beta thus shows some instability, but is relatively stable compared to the Nordea beta. Jensen's Alpha. Jensen's alpha is a common measure of performance. In the Nordea market-model regressions in Table 1 , the issue is whether the estimated intercept is significantly different from (1 -β) r f , where β is the market beta and r f is the risk-free rate. The sensitivity of results to forming abnormal returns suggests experimenting with other indices to form abnormal returns, as is done below by using the rates of return from the market index. The parameter instability detected above also suggests trying alternative sample periods. This footnote discusses the wealth effects on the acquired institutions; the reported results take account of the parameter instability in market models that a subsection below discusses. For Merita, both events have positive coefficients and the second event's coefficient is significant at the 0.39% level. For Unidanmark, the third event (the announcement of the merger attempt and its success was the same day) has a positive coefficient that is significant at only the 34.8% level. Bank Scope does not provide data on Christiana Bank of Norway, the third target, for the period of its acquisition. 15 An important literature discusses the behavior of abnormal returns over long windows; for a summary and important work, see Eberhart and Siddique (200X) . When a 101 day window (including the event day) is used, four of the five events have a positive coefficient (the fourth event's is negative), but none is significant at even the 10% level. In a Wald test that all coefficients are zero, the data reject the null at the 0.3832 significance level. 16 Under the assumption that each event has a 21-day window and the slope is the same for each event, the single event dummy has a slope of 0.004252, significant at the 7.89% level. Under the assumption that each event has a 101-day window and the slope is the same for each event, the single event dummy has a slope of -0.027481, highly insignificant, at the 80.11% level. 17 Including lagged values of the market rate of return, to adjust for possible thin-trading, does not importantly affect the coefficients on the event dummies or their significance. 18 When major events such as Nordea mergers and acquisitions occur, betas may well show volatility. Following Chan (1986) , suppose the Nordea beta shifts at the dates of the events. In a market-model regression that allows for five shifts in beta for the duration of each event window, only the interaction term of the market and the event dummy at the time of the first event is significant, at the 4.64% level. When event dummies are included separately in a regression that allows for shifts in the market beta at each event date for the duration of each event window, the second and third event dummies have significantly positive coefficients, at the 4.07% and 4.21% levels; again only the beta-shift at the first event is significant. The slopes on the second and third event dummies in this regression are 0.014547 and 0.006577 as compared to the slopes 0.015168 and 0.006588 in Table 2 . When 101-day event windows are used, and betas shift with event dummies, and event dummies are entered separately, the first and fifth beta-shifts are significant, at the 6.50% and 5.98% levels, and only the third event dummy's coefficient is significant, at the 8.64% level.
Market-Model Results for Nordea and Comparables.
When 101-day event windows are used and the slope is the same for each event, the interaction term between the market and the event dummy is insignificant, and the single event dummy entered separately has a slope of 0.001757, significant at the 5.94% level.
period. All events have positive effects, and events 2 and 3 are statistically significant at the 10.63% and 0.56% levels respectively. In a Wald test that all event coefficients enter with zero coefficients, the probability is 5.27%.
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Effects of Parameter Instability. The parameter instability that Table 1 reveals for regressions of Nordea rates of return on either market or comparables rates of return suggests that the event study results in Table 2 .A might be affected by rerunning the regressions to allow for parameter shifts. This is done over the period 1995-2003, allowing for intercept and beta shifts at the end of 2000 (comparable to Table 1 ). The shift in the intercept is far from significant and has little effect on estimated slopes of event dummies, and hence is omitted in regressions reported here. In the three regressions in Table 2 .B, the shift in the beta is important. In regressions of Nordea rates of return on the market, the slope on the second event dummy becomes less significant, and the slope on the third event dummy becomes insignificant. In regressions of Nordea rates of return on comparables, the slopes on the second and third event dummies both become insignificant. In regressions of comparables rates of return on the market, the slope on the second event dummy becomes less significant.
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Results for Two Individual Comparables. When using an index of comparables as a benchmark, it is possible that the index misrepresents or distorts what is going on with some of the important consitutents of the index. To shed light on this issue, Table 3 reports maket-model and event-study regressions regressions for two major banks, Danske (Danske Banken) of Denmark and SHB (Svenska Handelsbanken) of Sweden, both viewed by many as profit leaders and among the stronger Nordic financial institutions. For the sample periods [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] Including lagged values of the comparables rate of return does not importantly affect the coefficients on the event dummies and their significance. 20 In the three regressions in Table 2 .B, at conventional significance levels the data cannot reject the null that all of the slopes on the event dummies are equal to zero. Mechanically, the later period's beta of (approximately) zero implies that consciously or not Nordea arranged its assets and liabilities to provide a virtually complete net hedge against (world) market movements.
21 Success is then measured by beating the risk-free rate. An important question is why Nordea's management adopted policies that set its market beta to zero; only Nordea's management can aswer this question. Related, another important question was whether the market knew that the beta was so low and thus the implied hurdle rate for measuring success was so low. From the results above, the data are consistent with the view that the market understood that Nordea's hurdle rate was low: Because of Nordea's high market beta and thus 
Problems in Using Comparables to Evaluate Nordea.
It is worthwhile to spell out some of the problems encountered in using comparables to evaluate Nordea. Using comparables to adjust to give abnomal returns makes most sense when the required rates of return on Nordea and the comparables are equal. Suppose the required rate of return on Nordea's levered equity is determined by the CAPM, or RR N,eq,t = r f,t + β N,eq,t (ER M,,t -r f,t ), where r f,t is the risk-free rate at time t, β N,eq,t Nordea's levered equity beta and (ER M,,t -r f,t ) the risk premium on the market.
Similarly, in the CAPM the required equity rate of return on the comparables is RR C,eq,t = r f,t + β C,eq,t (ER M,,t -r f,t ). The difference is RR N,eq,t -RR C,eq,t = r f,t + β N,eq,t (ER M,,t -r f,t ) -r f,t -β C,eq,t (ER-M,,t -r f,t ) = (β N,eq,t -β C,eq,t ) (ER M,,t -r f,t ). If β N,eq,t ≈ 0.0, then RR N,eq,t ≈ r f,t , and the difference RR N,eq,t -RR C,eq,t is (β N,eq,t -β C,eq,t ) (ER M,,t -r f,t ) ≈ -β C,eq,t (ER M,,t -r f,t ). Because β C,eq,t is perhaps 0.50, the difference RR N,eq,t -RR C,eq,t is substantial and likely too large for use of the comparables as the benchmark to make sense for the sample period 2001-2003. The comparables expected rate of return should be higher by their beta for this period (≈ 0.50) times the risk premium on the market, or should be higher by about 2 1/2% if the market risk premium is taken as 5%/annum. Accounting valuation models depend on discount rates versus accounting rates of return.
Implications for Analysis of Accounting
Residual Income models (Edwards-Bell-Ohlson models) of equity value (Ohlson 1995, Feltham and Ohlson 1999) have received much attention (Dechow et al. 1999 , Myers 1999a (Ohlson 1995, Feltham and Ohlson 1999) , it is generally assumed that over time ROE t → RR eq,t , ceteris paribus, and thus EQ t → B t . Assuming ROE t → RR eq,t and RR eq,t varies over time, ROE t will also vary over time from this source (among other sources of variation), though with lags as ROE t "tries" to catch up with a time-varying RR eq,t . Note that if Nordea's levered equity beta is approximately zero, then RR N,eq,t ≈ r f,t and eventually competitive pressures will drive ROE N,t to r f,t . Similarly, competitive pressures will drive ROA N,t to RR N,U,eq,t , where RR N,U,eq,t ≈ r f,t (supposing that the betas on Nordea's debt and tax savings are approximately zero).
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In contrast to RI models of equity value, many analysts find the firm's overall value from
Free Cash Flow models, most frequently using a weighted average cost of capital that requires a levered-equity discount rate (Copeland et al. 2000) . In WACC versions of the Free Cash Flow
Model of firm valuation, the firm's current value depends on ROIC t -WACC t ,
(1 + WACC j ) + K 0 22 The assumption that the betas on Nordea's debt and tax savings are approximately zero is consistent with the assumption that the levered-equity beta is zero. The unlevered equity beta can be found by the same procedures for non-zero betas on debt and tax savings. 
Accounting Data and Nordea's Performance
In the following, accounting data are used in three ways for evaluation purposes. First, the Nordea holding company is compared with six of the largest Nordic financial institutions in the sample of comparables: Danske Bank and Jyske Bank from Denmark, Sampo from Finland, DnB NOR Bank ASA from Norway, and SEB and SHB from Sweden. Second, the Nordea holding company is compared with the complete set of 16 Nordic comparables. Third, the Nordea bank in each Nordic country is compared with the comparables holding companies from that country.
Data on ROE (Return on Equity) and ROA (Return on Assets) are in Table 4 for the six largest comparables, in Table 5 for the complete set of comparables; both tables give data on the Nordea holding company, Nordea Bank AB (consolidated), and the Nordea banks. Table 7 Relative to the average of the largest Nordic comparables, ROE is smaller for the Nordea holding company in both the longer and shorter periods, but ROA is larger for the Nordea holding company in both the longer and shorter periods. (In these comparisons, the larger value is in boldface in Tables 6.A and 6.B.) Relative to the average of all Nordic comparables, however, the Nordea holding company ROE is larger for both the longer and shorter periods.
Relative to the average for all Nordic comparables, the Nordea holding company ROA is smaller for both the longer and shorter periods. Taken together, the results for the large comparables and for all comparables, and for ROE and ROA, suggest that Nordea performed about as well as the Nordic comparables. Cost/income ratios in the individual Nordea banks in Table 7 are not exactly comparable to the ratios for the other large banks in the Norway during the period after 2000. In Sweden Nordea's bank has lost ground even more strongly relative to the major competitors SEB and SHB during the same period.
The trends in profitability in Table 6 .B indicate that ROE has been declining relatively for Nordea in all four Nordic countries, though less pronounced in Sweden in than elsewhere in spite of falling behind more there in terms of cost efficency. The comparables show an upward trend in ROE for Denmark and Finland, but not Norway and Sweden. For ROA, the Nordea banks show a downward trend in three Nordic countries but a slight increase in Finland. The comparables show an upward trend in ROA in Finland, 0.72 rising to 0.80, and small fluctuations for the other three countries. Thus, both profitability-and cost efficiency trends of Nordea banks are somewhat less favorable than the comparables.
Trends in Profitability.
By comparing results in Table 6 .B for the longer and shorter periods, the data can be used to investigate trends in profitability. For ROE there is a downward trend in Nordea's profitability in all for Nordic countries, though less pronounced in Sweden (in relative terms) than elsewhere. The comparables show an upward trend in ROE for Denmark and Profitability for Nordea banks thus tends to show somewhat less favorable trends than the comparables. Perhaps the Nordea banks' superior performance is being reduced over time.
Nordea Holding Company versus Nordea Banks. When these comparisons for the Nordea banks in individual countries are taken with comparisons for the Nordea holding company, they offer a puzzle. Focus on results for ROE; recall that ROE is comparable to the financial rates of return discussed in Section 3. On the one hand, the Nordea holding company does about as well on average as than the comparables in both the longer and shorter periods (Table 6 .A). On the other hand, when Nordea banks are examined, for ROE the Nordea banks do better than the comparables in seven of eight cases (Table 6 .B); the simple averages across the four countirs for Nordea and the comparables are 17.91% versus 13.323% in the longer period, and 15.32% versus 13.58% in the shorter period. (For ROA, the results are substantially more mixed.)
Arithmetic implies that Nordea non-bank operations are less profitable than are Nordea banking operations.
One explanation offered for this puzzle is that the performance of Nordea as a whole, but not the individual Nordea banks, was dragged down by Nordea's "General Insurance" operation.
Nordea disposed of this operation in 2002. It is quite difficult to take account of the effect of General Insurance. First, comparables holding companies all have some insurance operations, so both the Nordea and the comparables figures must be adjusted for general insurance. Second, the individual comparables treat general insurance in a variety of ways. For example, SHB's insurance operation was a mutual company and not included in the holding company's consolidated accounts until de-mutualization in 2002, and thus its effects need not be eliminated in earlier years. Some of SEB's insurance operations were consolidated in holding company accounts, some not. Sampo changed its relationship to various insurance operations over time, and its ownership share. DnB NOR ASA uses the equity method and thereby includes only the group's share in profits from the insurance subsidiary in their income statement, under "other income." For purposes of adjusting ROE to reflect General Insurance operations, the analyst needs the net income generated by the operations and the equity allocated to the operations;
clearly, the data needed to calculate these figures are unavailable for many of the comparables.
For this reason, only the effects of Nordea are shown.
As the rough figures in Table 8 show, eliminating Nordea's general insurance operation appears to explain part of the puzzle, but by no means the whole.
Summary Evaluation and Some Conclusions
Data for Nordea's price and dividends are available for November 2, 1995 to October 8, Again, the data support the view that Nordea performed about as well as the comparables.
In terms of accounting data, Nordea banks in individual Nordic countries outperformed comparables holding companies. In light of the roughly equal performance of the Nordea holding company relative to comparables holding companies, Nordea's non-banking businesses must perform less well than Nordea banks. One possible source of underperformance that is sometimes raised is Nordea's general insurance operations, which were sold in 2002.
Calculations suggest that this is part of the story, but only a part.
One viewpoint is that Nordea is correct about the gains to be reaped by being a large, integrated financial institution across all of the four Nordic countries. Another is that the economies of scale and scope that Nordea can hope to reap are not really there and that the costs of being a large, integrated financial institution across all of the four Nordic countries will defeat the Nordea experiment. So far the stock-market and accounting data cannot discriminate between the two views. The data for the Nordea holding company start on day 221. The rate of return of the market is found from the Financial Times Total Returns Index, in USD, converted to DKK. The index for the comparables is computed from the eleven comparables for which daily returns data are available; for the first 116 days, only ten comparables are available. ***,**,* Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Tables 6.A and 6 .B, the larger number is in boldface. The Nordea Holding Company is the Nordea institutions as a whole, whatever the actual name was in a particular period. The comparables are holding companies, and are thus not strictly comparable to the Nordea banks in Table 7 .B. 
